MULLINS, J.
This case primarily concerns whether the trial court has the authority to render summary judgment on grounds not alleged or briefed by the parties and which do not affect the court's subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff, Brenda Greene, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying her motion for summary judgment and granting the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants, Kevin Keating and Nancy Keating.
The defendants claim that, although the court considered a ground not raised specifically as a ground in the motions for summary judgment, it, nonetheless, properly granted their motion and denied the plaintiff's motion. In the alternative, the defendants argue that we should affirm the judgment of the trial court on the specific grounds alleged in their motion for summary judgment, which were fully set
We agree with the plaintiff that the court acted in excess of its authority, and, accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand the matter for consideration of the motions on the grounds alleged. See Bauer v. Waste Management of Connecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 523, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) ("If a judgment is set aside on appeal, its effect is destroyed and the parties are in the same condition as before it was rendered. W. Maltbie, Connecticut Appellate Procedure (2d Ed.1957) § 345.").
We briefly set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this case. In a civil action that preceded the present case, the defendants presented claims against the plaintiff alleging, among other things, that they had acquired a prescriptive easement and an implied easement over a portion of the plaintiff's adjoining property. They sought an injunction and damages. After a trial to the court, on April 23, 2010, the court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, from which the defendants did not appeal. On October 6, 2010, the plaintiff commenced the present action for vexatious litigation, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-568, against the defendants and the law firm that had represented them in their action against the plaintiff.
The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment raising opposing claims. In her motion and accompanying memorandum of law, the plaintiff asserted that she was entitled to judgment against the defendants on the ground that they had brought the prior action without probable cause. In their motion and accompanying memorandum of law, the defendants asserted that they were entitled to summary judgment on the grounds that they had probable cause to commence the prior action and that they had relied on the advice of counsel in commencing that action. The parties also submitted supporting affidavits and other documentation with their motions.
Following oral argument, the trial court, on September 11, 2013, issued a memorandum of decision in which it made two relevant determinations: First, the court determined that § 52-568 sets forth two separate and distinct causes of action, one under subdivision (1) and the other under subdivision (2); and, second, the court determined, on the basis of the plaintiff's complaint, that the plaintiff was raising only a claim of malice and treble damages, specifically pursuant to § 52-568(2), but that the plaintiff had not brought a claim pursuant to § 52-568(1).
The plaintiff claims, in relevant part, that the court acted outside of its authority in rendering summary judgment on a ground not claimed or briefed by the parties. She argues that the motions filed by the parties raised the issue of whether there was probable cause for the defendants to have commenced the prior action.
As our Supreme Court has explained: "[T]he court's function is generally limited to adjudicating the issues raised by the parties on the proof they have presented and applying appropriate procedural sanctions on motion of a party. . . . F. James, G. Hazard & J. Leubsdorf, Civil Procedure (5th Ed.2001) § 1.2, p. 4. The parties may, under our rules of practice, challenge the legal sufficiency of a claim at two points prior to the commencement of trial. First, a party may challenge the legal sufficiency of an adverse party's claim by filing a motion to strike. Practice Book § 10-39. Second, a party may move for summary judgment and request the trial court to render judgment in its favor if there is no genuine issue of fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Practice Book §§ 1744 and 17-49. In both instances, the rules of practice require a party to file a written motion to trigger the trial court's determination of a dispositive question of law. The rules of practice do not provide the trial court with authority to determine dispositive questions of law in the absence of such a motion." (Emphasis in original; internal
In this case, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the defendants had instituted the prior action against her without probable cause. The defendants filed a cross motion for summary judgment on the grounds that they had probable cause to commence the prior action against the plaintiff and that they had acted on the advice of counsel. Neither party raised a ground related to the plaintiff's allegation of malice or her request for treble damages, nor did they claim that such allegations restricted the plaintiff's ability to prove a cause of action for vexatious litigation on the ground that the defendants had commenced the prior action without probable cause. Accordingly, we conclude, under the facts of this case, that the court acted in excess of its authority when it raised and considered, sua sponte, a ground for summary judgment not raised or briefed by the parties.
Although the defendants timely filed a preliminary statement of the issues raising alternative grounds for affirming the court's judgment and briefed those issues, because the trial court essentially did not rule on the parties' cross motions, we decline to consider those alternative grounds, and, instead, conclude that a remand to the trial court for its consideration of this matter in the first instance is appropriate. See generally Singhaviroj v. Board of Education, 124 Conn.App. 228, 232, 4 A.3d 851 (2010) (reversing judgment and remanding matter for further proceedings after trial court summarily denied motions for summary judgment, which had relied, in relevant part, on preclusion grounds); Asgrow Seed Co. v. Wagner, 12 Conn.App. 547, 548-49, 532 A.2d 1305 (1987) (setting aside summary judgment and ordering trial court to reconsider motion because properly filed affidavit had not been considered by court at time judgment was rendered).
The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the trial court for proper consideration of the parties' motions and for further proceedings according to law.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.